Florida Law Review
Volume 50

Issue 1

Article 7

The Florida Constitution Revision Commission in Historic and
National Context
Robert F. Williams

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert F. Williams, The Florida Constitution Revision Commission in Historic and National Context, 50 Fla.
L. Rev. 215 ().
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol50/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Williams: The Florida Constitution Revision Commission in Historic and Nati

ThE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION
IN HISTORIC AND NATIONAL CONTEXT*
Robert F Williams*
I am deeply honored to be invited to come here to talk to you. It's
a terrific opportunity for me to return to my home state and to my home
Capitol Building, even though I got started, as many of you did, in the
old Capitol Building and the Holland Building. In the last twenty-four
hours or so that I've been here, I've had a chance to see friends,
classmates, mentors, and a whole range of people that I remember. I
want to say at the outset, I envy you. Twenty years ago I was involved
with the 1978 Commission, essentially as a lobbyist. Thirty years ago
I was involved with the Legislature as it worked with the product
prepared by the Constitution Revision Commission.' I dreamed that
maybe this year I'd be sitting out there the way you are now. If I
worked hard and continued my career here, I thought I might have had
that opportunity. But instead, I took a different route. I'm one of the
three or four people who ever moved from Florida to New Jersey and
reversed the flow of the usual migration. I've spent the last eighteen
years studying, teaching, and writing about state constitutions.
Why have I pursued such a course? It's because of what I learned
here in Florida; the ideas I got from the people you know and have
heard about in 1967, 1968 and 1978. I'm still pursuing those ideas and
I hope to continue to do so. I would like to say that I want to make an
early application here. Some of you will be appointing authorities2 in
2017, and I would like to have a chance to sit out there. I'm still a dues
This address originally was given to the 1997-1998 Florida Constitution Revision
Commission during its organizational session on June 17, 1997 in Tallahassee, Florida. To retain
the speech's original character, it has been edited only sparingly. Footnotes have been added
where material is directly quoted and where further reading might prove interesting.
** Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden, N.J.
B.A., 1967, Florida State University; J.D., 1969, University of Florida College of Law; LL.M.,
1971, New York University School of Law; LL.M., 1980, Columbia University School of Law.
The author served as a legislative aide during the drafting of the Florida Constitution of 1968
and represented clients before the 1978 Florida Constitution Revision Commission. He teaches
State Constitutional Law at Rutgers, and is the author of STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES
*

AND MATERIALS

(2d Ed. 1993), and

THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTrrtioN: A REFERENCE

GuIDE (updated 1997).
1. See Robert F. Williams, A Generationof Change in FloridaState ConstitutionalLaw,
5 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 133, 136 (1992) (reviewing TALBOT D'ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENE GUIDE (1991)).

2. Cf. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2 (providing the procedure for the appointment of members
to the 1997-1998 Constitution Revision Commission).
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paying member of The Florida Bar, and I'm going to keep paying those
dues for the next twenty years. In 2017 I'm going to be practicing law
in the State of Florida, and I hope you'll remember me!
1997 is actually a very big year for state constitutions in this country.
Of course, the main reason it's a big year is because this Commission
is sitting. But you're sharing your enterprise with a number of people
around the country. Some of you know that New York voters will
decide in November whether to call a full-blown constitutional
convention in that state? California just completed a constitution
revision commission which has filed its report. New Mexico recently,
in the last year or two, completed a constitution revision commission.
It's the 100th anniversary of the Delaware State Constitution. It's the
50th anniversary of our New Jersey State Constitution. Montana is
celebrating its 25th anniversary. So, there's a fair amount of activity
going on around the country with respect to state constitutions. I hope
that you'll try to get in touch with those people and stay in touch with
them because as unique as the Florida Constitution and the problems
and potential of Florida are, you do share a number of things in
common, I think, with others working on state constitutions in this
country.
This morning I want to see if I can paint a picture for you of your
place in the broad national context of state constitution-making and also
link what you're doing to the deep historical roots of this enterprise of
state constitution-making. Then, I want to talk a little bit about the
unique and special characteristics of state constitutions. Finally I'll
reflect on the processes of state constitutional revision in the 1990s.
I'm not going to make any substantive recommendations to you. I'm
sure you're glad of that. I think everyone is full of ideas already. Others
may expect you to have your whole agenda formed in your mind, and
I don't think you should do that.
I'm a little hesitant because I think opening speeches to constitutional conventions or constitutional commissions are like graduation
speeches. The next day nobody remembers what was said. But I know
that you know graduation speakers always say that. They always say, "I
know you're not going to remember what I said." I didn't remember
what the graduation speaker said at my graduation. But they go on and
talk to you anyway, and try to be the one speaker who is different, and
that's what I'm going to try to do. I hope I'll be able to succeed.

3. New York voters rejected the opportunity to call a convention in November 1997.
Richard Perez-Pena, Voters Refuse to Take Chances on Bond Act and Convention, N.Y. TIMES,

Nov. 6, 1997, at B5.
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You took your place yesterday as the next step in what's now a
221-year history, of state constitution-making. It began in 1776 in
wartime. Our New Jersey State Constitution began on July 2, 1776. That
is an interesting date it seems to me.
The state constitutions of that period were the domestic political
language of the Revolution. How should we structure our governments
now that we've declared independence? Even though we're still fighting
a war for independence, who should participate in our governments?
What should our institutions look like? What kind of rights guarantees
should be in these constitutions? These were the topics of debate during
that ten years while we fought the war, won the war, and struggled
trying to get a federal constitutional convention together.4
So the roots of this Commission reach deeply into that history;
directly to James Madison, Ben Franklin, and John Jay; all men in those
days, of course, white men who learned about constitution-making
working on state constitutions a decade before they got famous and
worked on the Federal Constitution.
These roots are not only deep. They're also wide. They spread all
across the United States to all the states which have adopted and revised
state constitutions. These roots also spread to federal systems all around
the world. Eighteen or twenty countries, such as Switzerland, Germany,
Brazil, Mexico and Australia, use sub-national component units or states
the way we do. Most countries don't, of course. It's too inefficient; it's
too much trouble.
You are now engaged in an enterprise that is being worked on in
South Africa, as they draft the provincial constitutions, their equivalent
of state constitutions. The former East German states, called Ldnder,
have just finished a process of revising their subnational constitutions,
most of them with the help of constitutional commissions. So, the now
reunified Germany is made up of component units, each of which has
a state constitution. These processes are also going on in Russia. Brazil,
last decade, completed the process of revising state constitutions.
Actually we have a lot to learn from each other
even around the world,
5
States.
United
the
in
states
other
not just in

4. See generally Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade:
Pennsylvania's Radical 1776 Constitution and It's Influences on American Constitutionalism,
62 TEMPLE L. REV. 541 (1989).
5. See generally Robert F. Williams, ComparatiaveState ConstitutionalLaw: A Research
Agenda on Subnational Constitutions in Federal Systems, in LAW IN MOTION: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE, CONSTITUTIONAL, CONTRACT, CRIMINAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, FAMILY & SUCCESSION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, MEDICAL, SOCIAL SECURITY,

TRANSPORT LAW 339 (Roger Blanpain ed., 1997).
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Subnational or state constitution-making in a federal system is
experimental. You've heard states referred to as the laboratories of
federalism, the laboratories of experiment.6 And since the beginning of
our country we have recognized state constitution-making as experimental, as trial and error. Even as early as 1778, Tom Paine, who was
famous because he advocated independence from England, was also a
very important state constitutional thinker in Pennsylvania. He applauded "the happy opportunity of trying a variety, in order to discover the
best.... By diversifying the several constitutions, we shall see which
State flourish the best, and out of the many posterity may choose a
model.... ."
Down through 221 years, this tradition of experimentation has come
to us. We've had hundreds of state constitutional conventions and state
constitutional commissions in this country, thousands of state constitutional amendments, and about 150 separate state constitutions. From the
beginning those experiments in the thirteen original states served as
models for the Federal Constitutional Convention. Actually, if you ever
decided that you wanted to sit down and read the debates of the Federal
Constitutional Convention, you'd see that a lot of what those debates
were about was whether they should follow the New York model or the
Massachusetts model. Nobody wanted to follow the Pennsylvania model,
and nobody wanted to follow the New Jersey model. It's very interesting and it's no accident that, literally, the first line of the Federalist
Papers addressed to the people who were worried about the new Federal
Constitution said, in effect, "New Yorkers, don't worry. This new
Federal Constitution, it really looks a lot like your New York State
Constitution." Actually, it might be the second line of the Federalist
Papers, but it's right up front.'
After the Federal Constitution was adopted, the state constitutional
tradition continued on its own course, a course different from that in
federal constitutional law. Through this period of time, of course, state
constitutions were both cursed and praised. But there's one thing that's
clear about this process of the evolution of, and experiments with, state
constitutions. It gave a chance for voices to be heard in constitution6. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
7. A Serious Address to the People of Pennsylvania on the Present Situation of Their
Affairs, in PENNSYLVANIA PACKET (Dec. 1, 1778), reprinted in 2 P. FONER, THE COMPLETE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 277, 281 (1969); see also Williams, supra note 4, at 543.
8. See Robert F. Williams, "Experience Must Be Our Only Guide": The State
ConstitutionalExperienceof the Framersof the FederalConstitution, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
403, 424 (1988) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 6 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed.,

1937)).
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making, voices that were never heard in the federal constitutional
process.
The fifty-five white men who drafted the Federal Constitution
obviously were not a diverse group. State constitution-making, though,
has heard the voices of women, African-Americans, Native Americans,
and Latino people; all kinds of people in our country have had a chance
to be involved on one level or another with state constitution-making.
And, of course, that's continued in this Commission today.
States continue to be the laboratories of experiment in the federal
system. States continue to copy ideas one from the other, or to reject
ideas that have been tried in other states and haven't worked. The
federal government continues to look to the states for models to
emulate. One only has to look at the current debates over the line-item
veto in Washington. That was invented in the states. Other examples
abound. The constitutionally mandated balanced budget was invented in
the states. Term limits were invented in the states. Constitutional
victim's rights provisions were invented in the states. You're the direct
descendants of these two centuries of experimentation.
Now, these experiments, these processes that we've seen unfold over
two centuries have reflected two kinds of experimentation. One has been
with the content or the substance of the state constitutions. That I'm not
going to talk about: what should be in there, what kinds of institutions,
what kinds of rights. I'm very interested in that, but it's not my topic
here with you today.
The other kinds of experiments have been procedural or
process-oriented experiments. Throughout these two centuries, the debate
has focused on how we can change state constitutions. Should you be
able to change state constitutions? How easy should it be? How often
should you do it? The question that's asked by one group is, how stable
should the state constitution be? Asking your question that way suggests
an answer. But the other way to ask that same question is, how rigid
should state constitutions be? Asking the question that way seems to
suggest a different way of looking at state constitutions. One view is,
keep it the way it is, stability is important. The other view is that if it's
rigid, it can block progress. Of course, we've seen that rigidity in many
states, including Florida before 1968 and possibly even today.
The first state constitutions didn't provide for their own amendment
and revision. The New Jersey Constitution was adopted July 2, 1776,
which is a date we all like to talk about in New Jersey because we beat
the Declaration of Independence by two days. That constitution
interestingly said that, if we settled with the British, if we settled the
"current controversy," as it was called, the constitution would be null
and void. It didn't say anything about what would happen if we lost.
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They knew what would happen. They would be hanged as traitors. But
it also didn't say anything about what would happen if we won. So we
did win the Revolution, and New Jersey was stuck for eighty years with
a constitution that nobody knew how to change. Finally, after a lot of
debate, people realized that the Legislature could pass a bill calling for
a state constitutional convention. So, we did have a convention in 1844.
This whole process question about how you revise or modernize a
state constitution has bothered Americans since the beginning, and it
still bothers us. I suspect it bothers you somewhat. How much change?
How quickly? These kinds of things. When we began, our New Jersey
State Constitution was drafted by the State Legislature, if you can call
it that. It was really a revolutionary congress. We really didn't have the
attributes of higher law that we think of for a constitution now.
Pretty quickly, though, Delaware and Pennsylvania invented the
constitutional convention. It's one of America's great contributions to
the constitutional learning of the world. This idea was refined in 1780
in Massachusetts where they had an elected convention and then
submitted their product to the voters, who adopted it. They had voted
down a constitution in 1778 during wartime, probably because it came
from the State Legislature and not from an elected convention. So, that
was one model, the elected convention with submission to the voters for
ratification.
Soon we developed the limited constitutional convention. The limited
constitutional convention is a terrific, creative response to the forces of
the status quo. It's a way of saying that there are certain things that are
too politically difficult to tackle, so let's just take them off the table and
work on some other things. We still would have the 1776 Constitution
in New Jersey if we hadn't had the ability to have a limited constitutional convention, which protected the equal representation for counties in
the Senate prior to one person, one vote. That Senate structure was a
very important thing, frustrating change.
About 120 years ago we saw the advent of the constitutional
commission, originally limited constitutional commissions, like the
Article V Task Force here. I would say that that was a limited constitutional commission focused on one reform topic.
Utah, fairly recently, has invented the continuous revision mechanism
through a permanent commission. Alaska is considering that now.
But in Florida, in 1968, we invented something new under the sun:
the appointed, unlimited, automatic Constitution Revision Commission
which has direct access to the ballot. The Commission that you serve on
today is the culmination of this process of trial and error, of trying to
deal with the question of whether the state constitution should be
immutable or mutable, changeable or static. The automatic feature, for
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many years, I thought was the idea of Chesterfield Smith or Sandy
D'Alemberte or somebody like that. Some of you know that there's
another guy who had the idea first; it was Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson
thought the constitution should reflect the views of the living generation
"so [the Constitution] may be handed on, with periodical repairs, from
generation to generation." 9
Jefferson hated the 1776 Virginia Constitution. So he, of course,
wanted periodic revision of it. I think in some ways your answer to the
question "Should the constitution be stable?" draws on what you think
of the current constitution, obviously. So I guess you can trace your
roots directly to Thomas Jefferson, which is probably uplifting,
depending on what you think about Jefferson. On the other hand, he
would probably call you repair people, merely repairing the constitution
to pass it on to the next generation.
The alternative to this was John Locke. John Locke, having no
problems of limited ego, did a draft constitution for the Carolinas that
provided that it would stay in effect "forever." This was an amazing
idea, but it was never adopted.
Like New York, about fifteen states now have an automatic vote on
whether to have a constitutional convention or not. But you're quite
unique in this commission that you have now. It is interesting that it has
not been copied by any other state in thirty years. The experiment, I
take it, is still under way. The final results aren't completely in, it seems
to me. But this process has certainly stood the test of time in Florida.
If I remember correctly, there was an amendment on the ballot to
abolish the commission. That was voted down. The commission has
been emulated. The Tax and Budget Reform Commission utilizes this
process, and has worked all right, depending on how you look at its
product.
All through this process we see changes in state constitutions, both
with respect to what they contain, and changes with respect to the
processes by which they would be updated or changed. The Englishman,
James Bryce, came to the United States in the 1880s, observed the
American governmental institutions, and commented that the American
state constitutions were "a mine of instruction for the natural history of
democratic communities."'" Forty years later, an American, James
Dealey, said, "One might almost say that the romance, the poetry and

9. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), quoted in Albert
L. Sturm, The Development of American State Constitution, 12 PUBLIUs 57, 72-73 (1982); see
also Williams, supra note 1, at 138.
10. 1 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 27 (2d rev. ed., 1891); see also

Williams, supra note 8, at 410.
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even the drama of American politics are deeply embedded in the many
state constitutions."" So, I think whether you like natural history or
whether you like romance and poetry, there's something in the state
constitutional tradition for you. Certainly, looking into the Florida
Constitution you can see poetry, romance, natural history, and some
other things, of course."
So, this Commission is the latest gadget, the most recent invention
in the technology of state constitutional change. It operates to shift the
burden of political inertia away from the status quo and toward the
possibility of change. It's an alternative to a constitutional convention
where the people have to vote whether they want a convention at all, as
we'll see in New York later this year.
I believe what we've learned about the way constitutional conventions operate can inform us about how you're likely to operate and how
you might take your responsibilities. I think you really should consider
yourselves delegates now that you have been appointed and sworn in.
You should consider yourselves a constitutional convention because you
will operate from here forward with all of the attributes of a constitutional convention in the traditional sense, except that you don't have an
elective constituency. Maybe that's a good thing, for a lot of you it's
probably a relief. Each one of you now has a statewide constituency
which in other respects is only shared by the Governor, the Cabinet
members and the United States Senators from Florida.
The 1978 Constitutional Revision Commission, to my way of
thinking, was the most open, deliberative and well-documented process
of state constitutional revision in the history of this country. That took
place before the Internet, e-mail, most kinds of video, and these sorts of
things. I don't think that today we see that Commission as the failure
that we once saw. I remember that crushing feeling the next morning
when the package was defeated. Some people remember that as a
feeling of elation, I'm sure, when that package was voted down. As you
know now, that package set the agenda for this next generation of state
constitution-making and, ultimately, was not a failure at all. 3
This Commission promises to be even more open and more
interactive, from the things I've heard, with the technology that we
have. I think, frankly, you may have to be even more interactive with
11. JAMES DEALEY, GRowTH OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 11 (1915); see also
Williams, supra note 8, at 403.
12. See generally Robert F.Williams, Introduction: The Stories of State Constitutional
Law, 18 NOVA L. REv. 715 (1994).
13. See generally TALBOT D'ALEMBERTE,

THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTIoN:

A

REFERENCE GUIDE 15 (1991); Steven J. Uhlfelder & Robert A. McNeely, The 1978 Constitution
Revision Commission: Florida'sBlueprintfor Change, 18 NOVA L.REV. 1489 (1994).
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the public if you want to be successful. I'll talk about that in a couple
of minutes. You've got a terrific groundwork laid already by the Collins
Center for Public Policy, the Article V Task Force, the Constitution
Revision Commission Steering Committee, The Florida Bar, and
probably some others. All kinds of people have offered their assistance
to you. I think you should know that people in other states are watching
you. People are very curious about this process. Even when I came here,
some of you asked me: "Is it true? Are we unique?" Yes, you are. And,
for that reason, people are very, very interested in how this process is
going to work.
It remains to be seen whether the State of Florida will become one
of Tom Paine's states that "flourish best," or whether the experiment
ultimately will fail. I think we're in a kind of crisis in the process of
state constitutional change in this country now. So it's more important
than ever that this experiment serve to teach people around the country.
Yours is an unlimited commission. I think that's good and bad. You
have an open mandate. But it means you'll have to focus; you'll have
to set priorities. You'll probably have to limit yourselves. This is part
of the mandate from the generation of 1968. Once you're appointed, you
set the agenda for what you're going to do.
The general climate is as follows: the public is generally unaware of
the state constitution. There was a survey ten years or so ago that
indicated over half of the public didn't know they had a state constitution, and I think about half of the lawyers don't know there's a state
constitution. The judges know. But even sophisticated professionals are
not very conversant with the state constitution at any level of detail. So,
I think you have a dual task. One is to fully educate yourselves about
the state constitution and its processes of change. Then you need to help
educate the public.
What are these state constitutions we're talking about? Because
they're called constitutions people think that they are like the Federal
Constitution, that they're little federal constitutions. People believe
they're clones of the Federal Constitution. No, they're not. American
state constitutions occupy a unique place in the legal and political
technology of our constitutional federalism. They are unique in their
origin. They're unique in their hierarchal place in the pecking order of
our legal system. They're chameleon-like, oddly enough. Within the
state, they are the supreme law of the state. They're constitutional
documents; they take precedence over all other forms of state law.
At the same time they're subservient. They're lesser forms of law.
They give way to any contrary federal law, including federal common
law, and even federal administrative regulations, if they're valid, trump
the state constitutions. So, it's a funny kind of animal.
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State constitutions also include things ranging all the way from what
we think of as the great ordinances of constitutions, such as the due
process and equal protection requirements and a scheme for the
separation of powers, to trivial, lesser kinds of constitutional legislation
and legislative detail. For this a lot of people have poked fun at state
constitutions as not really being constitutions. 4 My view is that they
really are constitutions, but they're different from the Federal Constitution; people have to understand that and accept it.
Well, how are they different? Let's look at this uniqueness for a
minute. They're different in their legal and political function. You heard
yesterday from Chesterfield Smith the basic notion that the Federal
Constitution enumerates delegated powers and then has the Bill of
Rights as kind of an afterthought, or really a deal to get the Federal
Constitution adopted. The state constitutions, by contrast, limit otherwise
plenary or residual power that the states never gave away to the federal
government. So, you do not have to find something in the legislative
article that authorizes the Legislature to pass a divorce law, a law about
wills, or a criminal statute. That is within the reserved plenary power of
the Florida Legislature that is unlimited, except by the state constitution
and by the Federal Constitution.
Now this is slightly overstated. If you look carefully at any state
constitution, you'll say, "No, that isn't right, or it's not 100 percent
right, because there are enumerations of power in the state constitution."
For example, the Supreme Court of Florida has the power to promulgate
rules of practice and procedure. It has the power to regulate the Bar.
That's a grant of authority. The Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission has the legislative and executive power to regulate hunting and
fishing. These are grants of power. These are enumerations of power.
Sometimes you'll see an enumeration of power to overcome a judicial
decision interpreting the 'state constitution to prohibit some exercise of
power. The way to overcome that decision is to amend the constitution
to grant the power. But, interestingly, almost all of these things
transform themselves from grants of power to limits on the Legislature.
The power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of practice and
procedure limits the Legislature. The authority of the Game and Fresh
Water Fish Commission limits the Legislature. The way to figure out if
you can hunt on Sunday is to look up the regulations of the Commis-

14. See generally, e.g., James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State
Constitutionalism,90 MICH. L. REV. 761 (1992). For responses, see Roundtable, Responses to
James A. Gardner,The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 24 RUTGERS LJ. 927
(1993).
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sion, not the statutes. So those grants operate as limits on the Legislature.
If these constitutions have a different function, if they work
differently, I wonder if they look different. Yes, they do. They're longer,
they have a different form, and they're layered. They reflect a mine of
natural history of democratic communities, poetry, and all those things.
They have specific limits in them.
If you look at your legislative article, for example, you will see that
it is filled with procedural restrictions on the Legislature. If the United
States Constitution had Florida's legislative article, we wouldn't have
had the shenanigans over the last month about the unrelated government
shutdown-rider being attached to a disaster relief bill. But they don't
have that limit. They've got the slim, brief, thought-to-be model
constitution. It's so great because it's short. I'm not so sure it's better
in that 'respect.
The detailed finance and tax article, local government article, and
education article all deal with matters that are uniquely within the
reserved powers of the states. You wouldn't have to have them at all.
You wouldn't need a finance and tax article. You wouldn't need an
authorization to the Legislature to levy taxes or borrow money. I'm not
sure how comfortable all of us would feel without those articles, though
I mean no offense to the legislators. People believe that those are things
that should not be left exclusively to the Legislature.
We have an expanding vision from the original state constitutions.
They grew over the years. We have an expanding state constitution that
ends up being pretty long. Every time you want to do something within
those areas that contain detailed limits, you have to make an exception;
that makes it longer. So it doesn't follow the common vision of what a
real constitution should look like when people think in a
one-dimensional way, a way modeled exclusively on the United States
Constitution.
If state constitutions work differently and look different, maybe there
should be a different way to change them. There is, as you know. As
we've discussed, the text of the state constitution is much more volatile
and fluid than the Federal Constitution. The Federal Constitution is
essentially unchangeable with some few exceptions. That's not true at
all for the state constitutions, yielding a slight paradox. These are
constitutional documents, protecting rights; yet they can be changed by
a majority vote. 5 In any event, state constitutions are tools of lawmak-

15. See generally Harry L. Witte, Rights, Revolution, and the Paradox of
Constitutionalism:The Processesof ConstitutionalChange in Pennsylvania,3 WIDENER J. PUB.
L. 383 (1993).
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ing. They're instruments of government, and it's clear that state
constitution revision does take place within the larger mechanisms of
state politics. None of you need to be told this, but I think we have to
remain aware of it. State constitutions are political. State constitution
revision is political, and that's fine.
Just a few more points about what I think is the current climate for
state constitutional change. I don't think it's a pretty picture, frankly.
Public discontent with government is one of the things that fuels the
initiative movement. The initiative is thought to be independent of
government. The problem with it, as everybody has pointed out, is that
it doesn't have the deliberative-compromise potential that the regular
institutions of government have.
Political scientist Gerald Benjamin was Research Director for the
New York Temporary Commission on Constitution Revision, which laid
the groundwork for the vote coming up in November on whether they
should have a constitutional convention or not. He identified a dilemma
that we have in current government discussions now: "[Tihe public
wants big change in government but has rejected the most thoughtful
and deliberative methods of achieving such change."' 6 They've rejected
the calls for constitutional conventions in essentially all of the states that
have had the automatic calls. 7 In Florida, you get to jump over that
hurdle.
The question, I think, is quite clearly whether you as a Commission
can operate in a way that will convince the public that you are
independent of the regular processes of government. I think you have
the potential to do that. Gerald Benjamin says, "To channel the public
discontent now targeted at state governments we need a method of
constitutional revision which is independent of existing governmental
institutions."'"
This Commission is independent of regular governmental institutions
and it does have that potential. I think you're going to need to consider
testing the waters for possible change, possibly before you reach your
final conclusions. The public hearing process may help in that respect,
but I think there are lessons to be learned from the initiative process,
including possibly, some polling.
There's a thing called the deliberative opinion poll which is supposed
to model what the public would think about something if they were fully

16. Thomas Gais & Gerald Benjamin, Public Discontentand the Decline of Deliberation:
A Dilemma in State Constitutional Relform, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1291, 1291 (1995).
17. Seeki.
18. Id. at 1299.
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informed.19 It seems like a fancy focus group, although I'm not sure.
Focus groups may be useful. An interactive process-a two-way flow
of information that would merge direct-democracy's independence from
regular governmental institutions-combined with the deliberative
consensus-building process that you have available to you may be
required.
Obviously, it's very important to try to gauge opposition or status
quo instincts ahead of time. A massive study of seven constitutional
conventions concluded, "Just as the delegates and the political activists
in each state tend to break down, ultimately, into 'reformers' and
supporters of the 'status quo,' so the electorate divides in a similar
fashion.... In short, constitutional revision potentially polarizes state
communities, or the attentive portions of them, along predictable
lines."'
There is a list of things that you're going to have to try to think
about doing. You've heard some of them already from some of the
speakers. But I think your most important job is to try to keep an open
mind for now. Give yourself time to come to understand this state
constitution. A lot of you know a lot about it already. I know that. But
you may not have thought about it in every possible way. Try to assess
how the Florida Constitution really touches the lives of Florida's people
and how it touches government. Obviously, much of what goes on in
government is not dependent on the State Constitution. Maybe if there
are problems, they don't need to be remedied in the state constitution.
You need to get a picture of the places where the government and the
people touch the State Constitution. Otherwise, I don't think you can tell
what, if anything, needs to be done.
I think you have to give yourselves time to come together as a
collegial body. This is a different institution from the Legislature. It's
a different institution from a city commission or anything like that. With
two exceptions, all of you are freshmen in this. You may have done a
lot of things in politics, but you haven't done this before. It's different.
This body will develop a collective personality; it's group dynamics. It
is different from other political bodies because you don't have to run for
re-election. You didn't have to run a campaign to get here, at least an
election campaign. What I'm really suggesting is that you try to
transform yourself into Commissioners from what you were the day
before yesterday and what you'll go back to being as this process

19. See id. at 1313 & n.82 (citing JAMES S. FISHKN,
NEw DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM 1, 84 (1991)).
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20. ELMER E. CORNWELL, JR. ET AL., STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE
POLITICS OF THE REVISION PROCESS IN SEVEN STATES 205-06 (1975).
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continues. That's partly why I think the Chairman asked you, from now
on, to call everybody "Commissioner," not Chief Justice or President or
whatever. It seems like a surface tactic, but it actually has some
potential to bring you together in a different way.
Try, if you can, to distance yourself somewhat from your current,
regular constituency. You do have a statewide constituency now. If you
can, distance yourself from your appointing authority, at least in some
respects. You need to do this to make the inside job work, to be able to
work together over the next year in this process. It's going to go beyond
the next year if you think about the ratification campaign, if you suggest
any changes. You need to have independence to work inside this
chamber together and also to present an independent face to the public.
Selling your product to the public is your outside job.
There were a lot of reasons why the 1978 revisions were defeated.
That was the beginning, really, of the current negativism about
government. 1978 was the year of Proposition 13, and I think it has just
gotten worse. Many people are not willing to trust what government
officials tell them. If you can begin to take on the identity of independent Commissioners rather than government officials involved in
government as usual, I think you'll have a better chance of convincing
the public to do what you want them to do. If you don't feel like
statespeople right now, if you don't feel it, wait a little bit, hang on. The
studies show that a high percentage of you will become statespeople and
will rise above the direct constituent kinds of things. Not all of you, but
most of you. So, try to wait.
Seek consensus. Build on the combined strength of this body. Maybe
you don't need a whole lot of ideas. Maybe you only need a couple of
good ideas that everybody can get behind. If you combine the clout in
this room, together with that of your appointing authorities, I'll bet you
could do anything you think the state needs. But if you, instead, spread
yourselves out, if you are beguiled by the unlimited nature of your
mandate, you may end up accomplishing nothing.
I would like to make a couple of more technical points. There is
general agreement that the State Constitution should be limited to
fundamentals and not legislative detail. Of course, your fundamentals
might be my legislative detail and vice versa. When I was representing
clients in front of the Commission in 1978, most of my fundamental
ideas were rejected as legislative detail. So this is not an easy dichotomy, but it's one that most people agree on. Most people that speak to
constitutional conventions and commissions say, "Stick to fundamentals;
keep it short." I don't think that's exactly the right way to go. Use some
words if you need them. Brevity isn't any sort of special virtue, it seems
to me. Of course you don't want to load up the constitution with rigid
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detail. Putting something in the state constitution elevates it to the
highest legal position in the state. It also puts the matter beyond change
by ordinary legal processes. It is good sometimes, and it's bad sometimes, to take something out of the normal processes of legal change.
Studies have shown that the good things are usually anticipated. But
bad things are usually unanticipated. There are things you couldn't
imagine or you couldn't predict, hard as you thought about it. So the
unanticipated negative consequences of putting something in a state
constitution really ought to be remembered."1
You might want to consider some sort of "constitutionalization
impact statement" to try to force yourselves to think beyond the pros
and cons of the policy that you're discussing, but also, even if it's a
good idea, to ask, "Do we need it in the Constitution?" You might
conclude that the matter should be constitutionalized. But what are the
costs and benefits of doing that?
You need to work on some of the technical questions. Will the
provision be self-executing? Will the courts enforce it without implementing legislation? If the court won't, why are you putting it in the
constitution? Maybe it just sounds good. Maybe it's a good idea. You
need to worry about the problem of negative implication where the
expression of one thing could be read as a limit on others.Y People put
in the state constitutions the mandate that widows of veterans get a tax
exemption. It sounded like a good idea. But when the courts told them
that the Legislature couldn't pass a statute giving widowers of veterans
a tax exemption, it didn't sound so good. What seemed like a good idea
turned into a limit on the Legislature.
Putting things in the state constitution delegates a lot of
decisionmaking to the judiciary. You don't always have to do that. We
just amended our constitution in New Jersey to include one of the
unfunded local government mandate protections. But the people didn't
want the court adjudicating the issue. So a commission was created. The
decisions of the commission are nonjusticiable; they're not reviewable
by the courts.23 But by and large when you put something in the state
constitution you delegate a decision about it to the courts. Some people
would say, "What's wrong with that?" But others might say, "Well, I
don't know if I want to do that." You need to think about it ahead of
time.

21. Frank P. Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our Tne, 54 VA.
L. REv. 928, 958-72 (1968) (discussing factors that weigh against constitutional inclusion).
22. See id. at 966-68.
23. See N.J. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 2, 9 5.
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What about sunset provisions? Sunset provisions could be used in
state constitutions. Do you think you have good idea? Well, let's try it
for a generation. Let the next generation muster a majority to keep it.
That's a possibility.
The Sunshine Amendment adopted here in Florida showed us another
mechanism. Part of that went into effect, but it could be changed by
statute. How could you do that? Because it says so in the amendment.24
That's an interesting mechanism, it seems to me.
In any event, the real question is whether the loss of flexibility is
worth it. Try to develop ideas for assessing these impacts as you debate.
What will the State of Florida be like in the next generation? I've
heard some current debate about changing the public housing laws
around, the country. There's an idea to go to more mixed-income
housing and some privatization. Almost all of that debate concludes that
state constitutions won't let us do it. The state constitutions were
amended 100 years ago to say that the states can't lend to private
corporations and to include other similar limitations.
So you need to think ahead. Do we have things in the state constitution that will limit what we ought to be doing for citizens? Consider
techniques for presenting the recommendations to the public. We saw
in 1978 that the separation of questions on the ballot didn't necessarily
protect the uncontroversial provisions. People just voted against all of
them. Maybe all of them were controversial. I don't think they all were.
If you can manage your unlimited mandate carefully and wisely, pull
together, and give yourself time to develop an independent identity, you
really will function as a constitutional convention. I think you'll be
successful.
Most people who give these kinds of speeches say you've got to try
to provide for the next 100 years. In Florida, you don't have to do that.
If you can get us to the next generation, there'll be another commission.
And, remember, I want to be on it. For better or for worse, you don't
really have to try to make a constitution for the next 100 years. But I
think if you do a good job, people will remember you for 100 years.
I'm going to leave you with the words New Jersey Governor Alfred
Driscoll used to open that state's 1947 Constitutional Convention. He
said:
The rights you exercise in this Convention were won in
1776 and protected in memorable struggles through the
years.... May you be blessed with clearness of vision,
soundness of purpose, and successful accomplishment, to

24. See

FLA. CONST.

art. II, § 8(h);

D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 13,
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the end that citizens of this State a hundred years hence
will repeat your names with pride and call you devout, wise
and just. Yours, ladies and gentlemen, is the opportunity of
a century.'
Two of you have had more than one opportunity to serve in this
body, but most of you won't get that chance. This is your shot. Most
people who participate in state constitution-making say it's the most
meaningful piece of public service in their career. I hope you'll be able
to leave an enduring legacy. I think you're privileged. I wish you the
best of luck, and I'll see you in 2017. Thank you very much.

25. 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 9 (1947).
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